“Animal Liberation” may sound more like a parody of other~lib- eration movements than a serious objective. The idea of “The. Rights of Animals” actually was. Animal Liberation. Peter Singer. I. We are familiar with Black Liberation, Cay Liberation, and a variety of other movements. With Women's Liberation some. by Peter Singer (). In recent years a number of oppressed groups have campaigned vigorously for equality. The classic instance is the Black Liberation.

Peter Singer Animal Liberation Pdf

Language:English, Japanese, German
Genre:Children & Youth
Published (Last):20.05.2016
ePub File Size:28.48 MB
PDF File Size:8.70 MB
Distribution:Free* [*Sign up for free]
Uploaded by: LATRICE

The groundbreaking and “important” book about animal rights by the author of Ethics in the Real World—including a new preface (Chicago Tribune). dation. These are Peter Singer's Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our They do so by advancing a case for granting moral rights to animals. publicly challenged about the morality and ethics of animal use. Responses to pain in animals are only physical and mechanical and Peter Singer and Animal Liberation. ▫ Published in . df/ ▫ Science and .

And since they have interests, when these are frustrated, it leads to suffering. Animals and humans have equal rights. In fact, to Regan, animals have similar essential properties like humans with regards to desires, memories, and intelligence and so on and this therefore gives them equal intrinsic value like humans. Regan is more radical than Singer. Regan begins his article by noting the commitments of the animal rights movement i they are committed to the total abolition of the use of animals in science, ii the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture, iii the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping.

He notes that there are people who claim to believe in animal rights but see nothing wrong in say hunting of animals, tests on animals. Regan argues it is unjust on the animals and tidying up institutions will not do.

According to Regan, what is fundamentally wrong with the way we treat animals are not the details that change from time to time but the whole system.

Writing in pain … is this right? To Regan, what is wrong is not the pain, not the suffering, not the deprivation. The fundamental wrong id the system that allows humans to view animals as resources to be used, to be eaten, surgically manipulated, loneliness, the suffering, the pain, the death of animals, what harms them.

This process is very complicated and long. It will need a change in education, publicity, political organization and activities against the treatment of animals.

In order for us to proceed, we must ask ourselves the moral status of animals by those who deny that animals have rights According to Regan, morality consists of a set of rules that individuals voluntarily agree to abide by. It is a form of a contract where we spell out modalities to be used even on those who lack the ability to understand morality and therefore cannot sign the contract themselves.

These include children who are protected by the contract even though they do not know what is in it, duties regarding them, our duties towards them as parents but not duties to them as children. This begs the question, how about animals with no contract they can understand or sign, do they have rights?

Regan argues that yes they have rights. Ultimately, a being who is not self-aware and who does not have a sense of themselves as a distinct entity, still has an interest in experiencing pleasure and avoiding suffering, therefore, they are still 28 Singer, Practical Ethics, Against Animal Liberation?

As stated above, equal treatment would mean dogs have the right to vote. Nevertheless, according to Margolis, moral judgements cannot be decided from only the sentience criterion.

For Margolis, there is no way to make sense of how animal interests could count equally with human interests.

For Steinbock, a certain minimal level of intelligence is required for a being to be morally considered. Valuing human life, explains Steinbock, is more acceptable because human interests count more.

Steinbock admits that it is difficult to account for morally relevant differences that would justify the use and exploitation of marginal cases over animals that have greater intellectual capacities. Indeed, it would be a speciesist act.

And Steinbock anticipates this, noting that it is not racist to provide special care to members of your own race provided that such care is not exclusive to one race. I will come back to this in a moment, but firstly I want to introduce another figure. Within the history of the debate against Animal Liberation, there is the curious case of Michael Fox.

While he readily agrees that we ought to be concerned with the welfare and exploitation of animals because they are sentient beings, this does not ipso facto equate to rights for animals. While humans have an obligation to avoid mistreating animals, it is an obligation without rights.

In , Regan articulated his deontological argument on animal ethics and would go on to argue the case alongside Singer. Other capacities, Fox agrees, such as rationality, intelligence, and symbolic communication are irrelevant in justifying equal treatment.

Inevitably, he sees the sentience criterion as insufficient for attributing rights. What counts, according to Fox, is a characteristic that all humans, not animals, generally share in common, virtually without exception. Why this would not count is not clearly explained.

As Regan argues, because if it did count, it would mean many animals would qualify as possessors of rights. Fox turns to one of the main arguments in the discussion of morality — autonomy. In conjunction with the aforementioned cognitive abilities, he defines autonomy as acting freely, rationally, creating, and self-making.

Autonomy is a pre- requisite for possessing moral rights. But what about those individuals who are not able to realise their auton- omy, such as those marginal cases?

If extra-terrestrials displayed autonomous characteristics, Fox goes on, without us knowing the general characteristics of their species, then they may also be granted moral rights. This is because humans are autonomous beings and are full members of a moral community. Animals, according to Fox, only possess instrumental 44 Like others above, Fox believes Singer is an advocate of rights, which he is not. Peter Singer and His Critics value, that is, value relative to the needs and desires of human beings.

However, this consideration of capacities essentially takes the form of humane treatment, not a Singerian principle. Both Singer and Regan strongly repudiate Fox for misrepresenting their claims.

What Singer and Regan do state is that pain is an intrinsic evil; therefore, the pain experienced by animals can be an evil equal to that of a human. For example, a horse has thicker skin to that of a human infant, so a slap of equal force would be experienced differently.

Singer refutes holding this principle. Such a capacity, as Singer points out, is speciesist by its definition, because it entails a belief that all members of the homo sapien species possess a special moral attribute that other nonhuman animals lack.

As above, Singer does not deny that most adult humans possess capacities that entail different interests, and which animals and marginal cases would lack. Referring back to Bentham, Singer does not care whether animals are capable of acting morally, but, more significantly, just as the principle of moral equality applies to human beings, such as infants and others who do not have normal intellectual faculties—those beings who are incapable of moral reasoning and respon- sibility—so too should nonhuman animals be included within the sphere of moral consideration.

In looking for such a justification we shall have come around again to where we started in our search for some characteristics that marks off, in a morally relevant way, all human beings from nonhuman animals. Under the capacity criterion alone, certain beings would be excluded from the moral community, even if they are members of the same species. But under the species criterion, when beings have exactly the same capacities but differ in terms of species, then only one the human possesses rights.

If Fox believes that all humans have inalienable rights, then he must abandon the position that autonomy is a necessary precondition. He cannot have it both ways. According to Regan, a different criterion for the attribution of rights is required.

Peter Singer and His Critics It is significant to note that a year after The Case for Animal Experimentation was published, Fox had a remarkable and transformative epiphany.

Fox no longer sees a justification for using animals as a means to our ends, regardless of the benefits humans may derive from using animals, such as animal experiments. In his paper on animal rights, Frey considers what he believes to be the most important arguments proposed by animal ethicists—marginal cases and morality.

Frey advances three propositions, two of which hinge on the rationality criterion as being a prerequisite for inclusion in a moral community. Unless, one of these three arguments is accepted, Frey argues, there is no basis to differentiate marginal cases from animals.

As stated above, the actual argument is that certain normative criteria for the possession of rights, if applied consistently, would exclude some humans as well as animals.

This is one significant reason for challenging, rejecting, and extending the criteria to include marginal cases and animals in the moral community.

Join Kobo & start eReading today

Furthermore, it is unclear why the the potentiality, similarity, and religious arguments are the best and most defensible arguments.

In any event, as certain animals, such as infant primates, would qualify for the potentiality and similarity arguments. Marc Bekoff, 2nd ed. Frey argues that animals do not have desires. They may have needs, such as a need for food and water, but this, in his view, is insufficient to qualify as an interest. Although he accepts that animals have instinctive behaviours, Frey objects to fraught anthropomorphic explanations about animal sub- jectivity.

Navigation menu

Desires, argues Frey, are based on beliefs, and beliefs are linked to language. Without language, beliefs and desires animals cannot possess interests and moral rights. Therefore, pain alone cannot be the only factor that counts. According to Frey, because of this it is riddled with the problems associated with inherent value, that is, a concept which is difficult to substantiate.

Frey is sceptical of the claim that pain is an intrinsic evil, and hence considers the foundations for ethical vegetarianism to be built on shaky grounds.

Animal Liberation.

Both proposi- tions, the capacity to feel pain as a prerequisite for interests and pain as an intrinsic evil, are considered wrong by Frey. Animals, Frey concludes, have no interests nor moral rights.

Cruelty to a child and cruelty to a dog are wrong, and wrong for the same reason, Frey asserts. A lack of autonomy does not diminish the capacity to suffer.

Peter Singer and His Critics potential for enrichment. This leads to difficult comparative analysis of quality of life and richness, which is made even more compli- cated when animals have inherently different capacities and concepts of a rich life.

Certainly, emerging research begins to colour the richness of the animal lives. Frey and Singer broadly agree that some human lives have greater value than nonhuman animals.

Read more Show all links. Allow this favorite library to be seen by others Keep this favorite library private. Find a copy in the library Finding libraries that hold this item Electronic books Material Type: Document, Internet resource Document Type: Peter Singer Find more information about: Peter Singer. Reviews User-contributed reviews Add a review and share your thoughts with other readers.

Be the first. Add a review and share your thoughts with other readers. Similar Items Related Subjects: Animal rights. Linked Data More info about Linked Data. Primary Entity http: Book , schema: MediaObject , schema: Intangible ;. InformationResource , genont: Home About Help Search.

All rights reserved. Privacy Policy Terms and Conditions. Remember me on this computer. Cancel Forgot your password?Consequently, there is no justification for not considering a sentient being. Regan argues it is unjust on the animals and tidying up institutions will not do. Animals that do not have the faculty to see themselves as existing over time are not plausibly persons.

Rich Dad Poor Dad. In particular, he argues that while animals show lower intelligence than the average human, many severely intellectually challenged humans show equally diminished, if not lower, mental capacity and that some animals have displayed signs of intelligence for example, primates learning elements of American sign language and other symbolic languages sometimes on a par with that of human children.

However, Singer argues, the adoption of veganism is a difficult step. Rachel Hollis. You may have already requested this item. Ryan Holiday. In any event, as certain animals, such as infant primates, would qualify for the potentiality and similarity arguments.

JEFF from Portland
Look through my other posts. I have always been a very creative person and find it relaxing to indulge in train spotting. I do love reading comics vainly.